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CLIMATE REFUGEES REQUIRE RELOCATION 
ASSISTANCE: GUARANTEEING ADEQUATE LAND 
ASSETS THROUGH TREATIES BASED ON THE 
NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAMMES OF ACTION 
Holly D. Lange† 
Abstract:  Rising ocean levels in the South Pacific threaten thousands of 
inhabitants with displacement.  Many of these small Pacific island states lack available 
land to internally accommodate displaced individuals.  Thus, thousands of “climate 
refugees” will be forced to move off their island homes and, without provisions of 
adequate land rights, will most likely end up in refugee camps in other countries.  
Climate change exemplifies an inherently global challenge.  Developed countries 
produce disproportionately more greenhouse gases, and developing countries lack 
resources to adequately respond to climatic displacement.  International treaties establish 
a legal responsibility to assist developing states adapt to climate change.  However, these 
treaties inadequately provide support to vulnerable Pacific states like Kiribati, a low-lying 
South Pacific island nation.  The Kiribati-United States Friendship Treaty, the South 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme Agreement, and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change all suggest legal responsibilities for the 
United States and other developed states to assist Kiribati’s climate adaptation efforts, but 
each treaty regime ultimately fails to elicit international response because the terms are 
vague and lack enforcement mechanisms.  A future treaty regime based on the National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action must establish a system to respond to climatic 
displacement by creating adequate land rights provisions. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The effects of climate change may displace two hundred million 
people both internally and across national borders by the middle of the 
twenty-first century.1  In recent years, increased frequency and severity of 
natural disasters pushed people from their homes on an unprecedented 
scale.2  Rising ocean levels, in particular, will likely displace thousands of 
the world’s first climate refugees3 in the South Pacific.  Rising ocean levels 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Sylvia Kang'ara for her guidance, the editorial staff at the 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their assistance, and her friends and family for their constant 
support.  
1
 See Office of the United Nations High Comm’n for Refugees, Forced Displacement in the Context 
of Climate Change: Challenges for States Under International Law, May 20, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/ 
4a1e4d8c2.html (last visited May 22, 2010) [hereinafter UNHCR, Forced Displacement]. 
2
 Dana Zartner Falstron, Stemming the Flow of Environmental Displacement: Creating a 
Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment, 2001 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 
(2001). 
3
 The term “climate refugee” will be used throughout this Comment to refer to individuals displaced 
by the effects of climate change.  The term has been criticized for sacrificing the dignity of displaced 
persons and over-simplifying climatic displacement.  See Jane McAdam and Maryanne Loughry, We Aren’t 
Refugees, INSIDE STORY: CURRENT AFF. AND CULTURE, June 30, 2009, http://inside.org.au/we-arent-
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could cover whole Pacific island nations, and upon displacement, these 
nations of climate refugees will require land rights elsewhere to establish 
functioning communities.4 
In the South Pacific, more than half of the population lives less than 
one and a half kilometers from the shore,5 and within twenty years, the most 
heavily populated areas in many South Pacific nations may become 
uninhabitable.6  Kiribati’s citizens, the I-Kiribati, 7 who live on low-lying 
coral atolls scattered across two million square miles in the Pacific Ocean, 
are particularly susceptible to climatic displacement.8  Already the I-Kiribati 
experience the effects of rising ocean levels.  What will happen to the I-
Kiribati as the ocean consumes their nation?  Where will they go?  What 
refuge and resources will the international community provide?  Without 
adequate land rights provisions, these people will be scattered throughout the 
world in temporary refugee settlements, lacking the resources or collateral to 
improve their livelihoods and establish functioning communities. 
Climate refugees require adequate land right provisions in future 
treaties to ensure effective international resettlement.  In this Comment, the 
phrase “land rights” refers to relocation and livelihood reestablishment 
assistance provided through vested property interests, housing, citizenship, 
or other mechanisms designed to ensure climate refugees adequate 
resettlement tools.  These land rights could be created in other nations 
through the establishment of new sovereign territories, or by providing 
climate refugees citizenship.  Land ownership and relocation assistance 
provide climate refugees the opportunity to adapt to their new surroundings 
and establish productive communities.9   
                                                                                                                              
refugees/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).  In fact, Kiribati’s President Tong has said he objects to his people 
being labeled environmental refugees, claiming that the title “refugee” comes with a stigma.  See NOW 
with David Brancaccio, Paradise Lost, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE (Dec. 12, 2008), 
http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/449/index.html (last visited May 22, 2010).  The author of this Comment 
does not intend any disrespect and simply uses the term “climate refugee” as a succinct way to refer to 
someone displaced by climate change. 
4
 The effects of climate change will also cause extensive internal displacement.  However, this 
Comment addresses international climatic displacement, where entire nations will be displaced, requiring 
land rights abroad.  See William Gumede, Copenhagen is a Disaster for Africa, ABBAY MEDIA (Ethiopia), 
Dec. 23, 2009, http://abbaymedia.com/News/?p=3131 (last visited Apr. 10, 2001). 
5
 See AlexT., Commonwealth MPs Call for Action on Climate Change, COMMONWEALTH 
CONVERSATION, Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.thecommonwealthconversation.org/2009/10/commonwealth-




 Citizens of Kiribati refer to themselves as “I-Kiribati.” 
8
 Paradise Lost, supra note 3. 
9
 See Simon Levine and Judy Adoko, Land Rights and Displacement in Northern Uganda, 
HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE MAG., July 2006, available at http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2813. 
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“Studies produced at the request of the World Bank demonstrate that 
one of the rudimentary causes of poverty and income inequality is unequal 
access to and possession of [land] assets.”10  Despite the value of land rights, 
the international community is far from recognizing their necessity.  While 
existing climate change treaties neglect land rights, they do provide possible 
platforms for delineating the land rights necessary to support successful 
relocation.  Specifically, the Friendship Treaty between the United States and 
Kiribati, the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (“SPREP”) 
Agreement, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”) all establish legal responsibilities for developed states 
to provide assistance to Kiribati to ensure security, protect the environment, 
and provide adaptation mechanisms for climatic displacement.11  Each of 
these international agreements establishes tenuous legal responsibilities for 
developed states to aid or compensate Kiribati for the negative effects of 
climate change, but each treaty regime fails to elicit a response from the 
international community, and none of the treaties discuss land rights 
provisions for climate refugees.  The existing framework established through 
the UNFCCC’s National Adaptation Programmes of Action (“NAPA”) plan 
provides a valuable platform for developing future provisions of land rights 
for climate refugees. 
This Comment explores the climate challenges facing Kiribati, which   
exemplify the need for establishing land rights in international agreements.  
Part II details the reality and effects of rising ocean levels in the South 
Pacific generally and Kiribati specifically.  Further, Part II outlines the 
necessity of land rights for climate refugees and explores possible specific 
characteristics of land rights provisions.  Part III discusses the international 
legal mechanisms that could address climatic displacement and land rights, 
emphasizing the benefits of treaties.  Part III also considers existing 
international treaties that create tenuous legal responsibilities for developed 
states to provide assistance to address climatic displacement, including the 
Friendship Treaty, the SPREP Agreement, and the UNFCCC.  Part IV 
discusses why these legal obligations are inadequate and what future 
agreements ought to include, focusing particularly on land rights provided 
through a new treaty based on the National Adaptation Programme of Action 
system.  
                                           
10
 Bernadette Atuahene, Legal Title to Land as an Intervention Against Urban Property in 
Developing Nations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2004); Nancy Birdsall & Juan Luis 
Londono, Asset Inequality Does Matter: Lessons From Latin America 15 (Inter-America Dev. Bank, OCE 
Working Paper 1997). 
11
 See infra Part III.B. 
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II. KIRIBATI FACES DAUNTING CLIMATE CHALLENGES THAT COULD 
DISPLACE THE ISLAND’S ENTIRE POPULATION 
No nation is safe from climate change, and the effects are already 
visible around the world with more frequent and severe storms, 
desertification, and rising ocean levels.12  The consequences of climate 
change13 will be especially severe in the South Pacific where rising sea 
levels threaten to overtake low-lying islands in the next century.14   
Widespread displacement results in refugee camps with significant health 
and security risks.15 
A. Anthropogenic Release of Greenhouse Gases Causes Global Warming 
Human behavior since the Industrial Revolution resulted in increased 
levels of greenhouse gases.16  The scientific community largely agrees that 
greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide, alter the Earth’s natural 
systems.17  While skeptics insist that these climatic changes are part of a 
natural global cycle, 18 this Comment starts from the position that the climate 
is changing as a result of human behavior.  
Rising sea levels represent one of the most serious consequences of 
global warming.19  Water expands as it warms, and warmer waters both 
                                           
12
 See Richard Neil Ilagan, Obama Administration: Global Warming Effects are Everywhere, DAILY 
CONTRIBUTOR, June 17 2009, http://dailycontributor.com/obama-administration-global-warming-effects-
are-everywhere/5565/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2010). 
13
 The terms “climate change” and “global warming” will be used interchangeably throughout this 
Comment. 
14
 Alexander Gillespie, Small Island States in the Face of Climate Change: The End of the Line in 
International Environmental Responsibility, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 107, 113 (2004); See Lester R. 
Brown, Rising Sea Level Forcing Evacuation of Island Country, EARTH POL’Y INST., Nov. 15, 2001, 
http://www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/plan_b_updates/2001/update2 (last visited Apr. 5, 2010). 
15
 David A. Martin, Migration and Refuge in the Twenty-First Century: A Symposium in Memory of 
Arthur Helton: A New Era for U.S. Refugee Resettlement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 299, 317 (2005). 
16
 Sarah A. Peay, Joining the Asia-Pacific Partnership: The Environmentally Sound Decision? 18 
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 477, 479 (2007). 
17
 Anthony Oliver-Smith, Climate Change and Population Displacement: Disasters and Diasporas 
in the Twenty-First Century, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM ENCOUNTERS TO ACTIONS 
117 (Susan A. Crate & Mark Nuttal eds., 2009); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (S. Solomon et 
al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT 2007]; Naomi Oreskes, The Ivory Tower: The Scientific 
Consensus on Climate Change, SCIENCE, Dec. 3, 2004, at 1686, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/ 
full/306/5702/1686 (last visited Apr. 5, 2010). 
18
 See Doug L. Hoffman, Global Warming Predictions Invalidated, RESILIENT EARTH, Nov. 5, 2009, 
http://www.theresilientearth.com/?q=content/global-warming-predictions-invalidated (last visited Apr. 5, 
2010). 
19
 Oliver-Smith, supra note 17, at 117. 
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directly cause ocean levels to rise and cause ice to melt at the polar caps.20  A 
2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report 
conservatively estimates that sea levels could rise between nearly one foot 
and 1.9 feet by the end of the twenty-first century.21  “The crux of the sea 
level issue is that it starts very slowly but once it gets going it is practically 
unstoppable.”22  Even if international society reaches zero emissions, sea 
levels will continue to rise at a steady rate for centuries.23  Thus, the 
international conversation surrounding climate change responses must 
adequately consider the effects of global warming and shift the policy debate 
to adaptation mechanisms, including methods to respond appropriately to 
climatic displacement. 
B. Kiribati Faces Serious Climate Impacts as a Vulnerable, Low-Lying 
Pacific Island 
Kiribati’s geography, political history, and economy leave the country 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change.  Kiribati consists of thirty-three 
tiny coral atolls, dispersed over nearly two million square miles, straddling 
the equator between Hawaii and Australia.24  Despite its expansive ocean 
territory, the habitable land in Kiribati would fit within New York City’s 
limits,25 and only 100,000 people live in Kiribati.26  Kiribati struggled with 
foreign occupation until its independence in 1977, and the islands remain 
plagued by economic and political instability.27 
                                           
20
 John H. Knox, Symposium: Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 479 (2009). 
21
 IPCC REPORT 2007, supra note 17; Cristine Russell, First Wave: The presidents of Two Island 
Nations Draft Escape Plans, Anticipating Sea Level Rise, SCIENCE NEWS, Feb. 28, 2009, at 24. 
22
 See Gerard Wynn, Two Meter Sea Level Rise Unstoppable, REUTERS (Oxford), Sept. 30, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58S4L420090930 (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
23
 Denis Culley, Note, Global Warming, Sea Level Rise and Tort, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 91, 99 
(2002); What can you do about a Vanishing Nation? See “The President’s Dilemma,” Coming Up on BBC 
World, INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV., Dec. 11, 2009 [hereinafter IFAD], 
http://www.ifad.org/media/video/kiribati/index.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010); Wynn, supra note 22. 
24
 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, AUSTRALIA-OCEANIA: KIRIBATI, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kr.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2010); Paradise Lost, supra note 3. 
25
 New York City’s limits measure approximately 320 square miles.  CHRISTINA WONG, PHYSICS 
FACTBOOK: AREA OF NEW YORK CITY (Glenn Elert ed., 2002), 
http://hypertextbook.com/facts/2002/JordanLevine1.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
26
 The population of New York City, according to the 2008 Census Bureau Estimate, is 19,490,297.  
NYC.gov, Population: Current Population Estimate, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur 
.shtml (last visited May 22, 2010); IFAD, supra note 23. 
27
 See Kiribati-History, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/ 
Asia-and-Oceania/Kiribati-HISTORY.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010); CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra 
note 24. 
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Kiribati is one of the least developed Pacific Islands with a wildly 
fluctuating economy highly dependent on foreign aid.28  The islands’ 
valuable phosphate reserves were exhausted at the time of independence, 
and further economic development is constrained by a shortage of skilled 
workers, a weak infrastructure, and remoteness from international markets.29  
Tourism provides more than one-fifth of Kiribati’s gross domestic product 
(“GDP”), and twenty to twenty-five percent of the GDP comes from foreign 
financial aid.30  With inadequate resources to respond to climate change,31 
the effects of climate change will disrupt the daily lives and health of the I-
Kiribati, eventually forcing migration off the islands. However, most I-
Kiribati will not be able to purchase new land abroad. 
1. Climate Change Damages Agriculture, Biodiversity, Economics, 
Health, and Culture on Kiribati 
A 1.9 foot rise in sea level would dramatically alter life on Kiribati 
through direct encroachment of water and saltwater intrusion into soil and 
freshwater sources.32  Most of the islands of Kiribati are less than two meters 
above sea level.33  Two uninhabited Kiribati islands, Tebua and Bikeman, 
have already vanished completely.34  In the coming decades, rising ocean 
levels will “drown” Kiribati, forcing displacement of the I-Kiribati.35 
Inhabitants of low-lying islands in the South Pacific like Kiribati face 
serious, daily effects of climate change including:  loss of land, loss of 
homes, storm surges, damaged marine ecosystems, disrupted food sources, 
compromised fresh drinking water, and loss of livelihoods connected to the 
ocean or tourism.36  For example, scientists predict that salinization will 
make low-lying Pacific Islands uninhabitable long before water actually 
                                           
28






 Culley, supra note 23, at 106. 
32
 IFAD, supra note 23; IPCC REPORT 2007, supra note 17. 
33
 Gillespie, supra note 14, at 113. 
34
 Rebecca Tsosie, The Change of Environmental Justice: Taking Stock: Indigenous People and 
Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1637 (2007); Paradise 
Lost, supra note 3; Daniel Williams, There's Debate About the Causes, But Rising Seas Are Lapping Away 
the Edges of Tiny Island Nations-and Could Eventually Drown Them, TIME PACIFIC, Aug. 27, 2001, 
http://www.time.com/time/pacific/magazine/20010820/climate.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
35
 See David Perlman, Oceans Rising Fast, New Studies Find, SF GATE, Mar. 24, 2006, 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2006-03-24/news/17284797_1_level-rise-sea-ice-sea-level (last visited Apr. 10, 
2010). 
36
 Ruth Gordon, The Climate of Environmental Justice: Taking Stock: Climate Change and the 
Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Inequity, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1595 (2007); Tsosie, 
supra note 34, at 1636. 
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overtakes the islands.37  The islands’ porous coral foundations allow 
saltwater intrusion into freshwater sources.38  Saltwater intrusion into 
freshwater and the soil destroys agricultural productivity.39  In addition to 
damaging agriculture, salinization also causes a loss of adequate drinking 
water.40   
Rising ocean levels impact island lifestyle beyond the direct effects on 
agriculture and human heath.41  With livelihoods changed by a loss of 
tourism and a loss of fishing resources, island inhabitants will be forced to 
seek alternative lifestyles and employment opportunities.42  
2. Rising Ocean Levels Force Coastal Communities from their Homes 
With threats to agriculture, biodiversity, the economy, health, and 
culture on Kiribati, its citizens must consider eventual relocation.  Most of 
Kiribati’s 94,000 shoreline village residents face the prospect of 
displacement; some have already relocated from century-old sites.43  
Kiribati’s President Anote Tong says of relocation, “We’re doing it now . . . 
it’s that urgent.”44  President Tong actively addresses the international 
displacement of the I-Kiribati, proposing relocation in Australia and New 
Zealand.45  When Tong was asked whether he would eventually divide his 
people among other nations, Tong replied, “The question is, do I have a 
choice?”46  
C. Adequate Land Rights are Essential for Successful Climatic 
Relocation Efforts 
When island nations like Kiribati are displaced due to rising ocean 
levels, land rights must be carefully considered and incorporated into the 
international response to ensure successful relocation efforts.  In the South 
                                           
37
 IFAD, supra note 23. 
38
 See Water Plan Helps Sinking Kiribati Stay Afloat, PACIFIC ISLANDS BROAD. ASS’N, Mar. 3, 2009, 
http://sealevelrise.blogspot.com/2009/03/water-plan-helps-sinking-kiribati-stay.html (last visited Apr. 10, 
2010). 
39
 Gordon, supra note 36, at 1595, 1596; Tsosie, supra note 34, at 1636. 
40
 Tsosie, supra note 34, at 1636. 
41
 See Jonathan Adams, Rising Sea Levels Threaten Small Pacific Island Nations, N.Y. TIMES, May 
3, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/world/asia/03iht-pacific.2.5548184.html?_r=1. 
42
 Gordon, supra note 36, at 1597; Gillespie, supra note 14, at 114; Paradise Lost, supra note 3. 
43
 See Climate Change Pushes Kiribati Underwater, GSTAAD PROJECT, June 15, 2008, 
http://gstaadblog.wordpress.com/2008/06/15/climate-change-pushes-kiribati-underwater/ (last visited Apr. 




 Knox, supra note 20, at 498. 
46
 Paradise Lost, supra note 3. 
620 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 19 NO. 3 
 
 
Pacific, people view their ancestral land plots as part of themselves and part 
of their families.47  Thus, land on Kiribati is not considered a fungible 
commodity.48 
In its set of Key Messages and Recommendations to State Parties to 
the UNFCCC, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (“UNHCR”) explained the necessity of assisting climate-induced 
migrations.49  In order to accommodate climate-induced migrants, states 
receiving climate refugees must provide adequate land rights.50   Secure land 
rights facilitate economic development including increasing productivity, 
improving efficiency of land use, increasing access to credit, increasing 
investments in the land, increasing the value of the land, reducing 
environmental degradation, and creating political stability.51  These benefits 
allow climate refugees to resettle successfully. 
Despite its necessity, creating treaty regimes and international 
solutions to climatic displacement remains daunting.  Individual landowners 
will lose their land due to rising ocean levels.  If international legal 
mechanisms do not include adequate land rights provisions, climatic 
displacement will result in climate refugee camps scattered around the 
world.  Providing land ownership and adequate land rights allows families to 
produce their own food, raise money, take out loans, and improve their 
economic positioning.52  Without land rights, climate refugees from low-
lying islands like Kiribati will remain a transient population, continually 
dependent on the international community to supply basic services.53 
Efforts to provide land rights to climate refugees face a number of 
challenges, beyond acquiring funding and assistance from developed states.  
Governments and non-governmental organizations involved in the relocation 
                                           
47
 See RON CROCOMBE, Overview: The Pattern of Change in Pacific Land Tenures, in LAND TENURE 
IN THE PACIFIC 3 (Selwyn Artangai et al. eds., 1987).  This Comment makes generalizations about the 
overall necessity of adequate land rights provisions, without delving into the unique make-up of individual 
South Pacific land tenure systems, which vary dramatically from island to island in modern nations. 
48
 Id. at 4. 
49
 UNHCR, Forced Displacement, supra note 1. 
50
 “States should consider establishing alternative forms of protection for those persons who do not 
qualify as refugees but whose return is not feasible or not reasonable due to circumstances in the place of 
origin an/or personal conditions, including particular vulnerabilities.  They should ensure that migration.”  
Id. 
51
 Tim Hanstad, Roy L. Prosterman & Robert Mitchell, Poverty, Law and Land Tenure Reform, in 
ONE BILLION RISING: LAW, LAND AND THE ALLEVIATION OF GLOBAL POVERTY 36, 36 (Roy L. Prosterman 
et al. eds., 2009). 
52
 Roy L. Prosterman & Tim Hanstad, Land Reform in the Twenty-First Century: New Challenges, 
New Responses, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 763, 763 (2006). 
53
 See Dale Buscher, Why Refugees Need to Make a Living, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 11, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dale-buscher/why-refugees-need-to-make_b_256589.html (last visited Apr. 
10, 2010). 
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and land rights provision process must be mindful of mistakes of past 
relocation efforts, appropriate titling systems, and location selection.54 
1. Relocation Projects Must Avoid the Mistakes of Past Projects in 
Selecting a Location and Supporting the Relocated Community 
 In providing land ownership in new locations, governments must be 
careful not to fall into the same traps as historic relocation efforts.  
Government policies to redistribute significant plots of titled land in isolated 
areas tend to produce high concentrations of poverty.55  For example, in 
World Bank funded dam projects that include forcible removal programs like 
the Narmada Dam in India,56 individuals have been stripped of their land and 
placed in resettlement colonies that lack sufficient services and economic 
opportunities for the colony inhabitants.57  Further, past resettlement 
programs have proven extremely costly with establishment of agricultural 
production in the new region, development of infrastructure, and 
construction of housing, schools, and hospitals.58   
2. Relocation Sites Play a Vital Role in Determining the Success of a 
Project 
Because entire Pacific states like Kiribati will be displaced by climate 
change, selecting a destination for relocation in foreign nations presents an 
additional challenge.  Where should the land come from?  Acquiring existing 
public land seems like a natural solution, but the land may be inadequate, 
squatters may use the land already, and the land could be distant from 
existing communities and infrastructure.59  Land ought to be acquired 
through market-based mechanisms, whereby governments, international 
organizations, or beneficiaries acquire land through the market, buying and 
selling the land like any private actor.60  Voluntary sale of land results in 
                                           
54
 This section assumes that someday climate change will displace entire South Pacific nations, 
forcing entire countries to relocate abroad. 
55
 Atuahene, supra note 10, at 1119. 
56
 Patrick McCully, Resolution on Narmada and the World Bank on the Occasion of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the World Bank, 26 BULLETIN CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 90 (1994), available at 
http://criticalasianstudies.org/assets/files/bcas/v26n04.pdf. 
57
 Dana L. Clark, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: The World Bank and Human Rights: 
The Need for Greater Accountability, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 213 (2001). 
58
 Roy L. Prosterman, Redistributing Land to Agricultural Laborers, in ONE BILLION RISING: LAW, 
LAND AND THE ALLEVIATION OF GLOBAL POVERTY 123 (Roy L. Prosterman et al. eds., 2009); Clark, supra 
note 57, at 221. 
59
 Prosterman, supra note 58, at 125. 
60
 Id. at 129. 
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fewer conflicts, and the land may be carefully selected.  Locations must be 
geographically strategic, located near sources of employment, productive 
land, and infrastructure.61  Ultimately, the quality of the resettlement location 
plays a major role in the success of the relocation.62 
 Despite challenges associated with acquiring adequate land rights, 
selecting land location, and acquiring adequate funding, these measures are 
necessary to prevent climate refugees from living in refugee camps around 
the world without the means to improve their positions.  Land rights 
represent a vital component in future legal regimes that address climate 
change and climate displacement for people like the I-Kiribati.  
3. Successful Relocation Projects Require Participation by the 
International Community 
The displacement of entire nations represents an unprecedented 
international emergency, and the international community must prepare to 
respond adequately.  As discussed below, treaties represent the appropriate 
international legal mechanism to facilitate the relocation of displaced 
populations.  As such displacement is an inherently international problem, 
treaties appropriately provide a binding international solution. 
Countries may decide to opt into future climate treaties for a number 
of reasons.  First, countries may feel that their own security interests will be 
served.63  In fact, the United States Department of Defense acknowledges 
that global warming represents the biggest threat to national security.64  With 
the United States’ heightened interest in security in the past few years, the 
United States could decide to sign onto a climatic displacement treaty.65  
“Desperation breeds violence,” and countries could avoid internal and 
international disputes by providing land rights to climate refugees.66  
                                           
61




 Michael J. Kelly, Ten Questions: Responses to the Ten Questions, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 




 See Kate Sheppard, National Security Emphasis Could Inspire Support for Climate Bill, GRIST, 
July 22, 2009, http://www.grist.org/article/2009-07-22-national-security-support-climate-bill-john-warner/ 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
66
 Paul J. Smith, Geography and the Boundaries of Confidence: Military Responses to the Global 
Migration Crisis: A Glimpse of Things to Come? 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77 , 79 (1999); Desperation 
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Second, developed countries are responsible for causing climate change,67 so 
assisting climate refugees takes on a compensatory nature.   
III. A NEW TREATY REGIME MUST BE CREATED TO OVERCOME THE 
INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING TREATIES AND ESTABLISH LAND RIGHTS 
FOR CLIMATE REFUGEES FROM COUNTRIES LIKE KIRIBATI 
Current climate-related treaties fail to establish sufficient enforceable 
legal obligations to assist with climatic displacement for countries like 
Kiribati.  No existing treaties explicitly mention climate refugees, yet a new 
treaty represents the most appropriate legal mechanism to provide land 
rights to climate refugees. 
A. Treaties Represent the Appropriate Legal Mechanism to Provide Land 
Rights to Climate Refugees 
Academics advance four international legal principles to address 
climate change.68  Options for providing land rights include litigation, the 
“responsibility to protect” doctrine, human rights norms, and existing 
refugee laws.  Ultimately, treaties represent the best method for responding 
to climatic displacement because these four options fall short of providing 
land rights for climate refugees. 
1. Litigation to Provide Land Rights for Climate Refugees will not 
Adequately Respond to the Scope of Climatic Displacement 
Litigation is a possible mechanism for bringing climate-related 
claims, but litigation measures prove inherently ineffective.  Litigation does 
not immediately address root problems of climatic displacement because 
litigation often only serves to identify punitive measures.69  Also, litigation 
does not guarantee results—courts could decide that climate refugees are not 
entitled to land rights.70  Further, states like Tuvalu, another low-lying 
Pacific state that threatened to bring suit based on climate change against the 
United States and Australia in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), 
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WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 579, 582 (2004). 
70
 Martha Middleton and Viki Quade, Corporations Hunt Ways to Cut Legal Costs, 68 A.B.A. J. 523 
(1982). 
624 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 19 NO. 3 
 
 
struggle with proving causation.71  Developed states produce 
disproportionately more emissions, but it is difficult to prove in court that 
one developed nation’s emissions caused particular consequences in another 
country.72  Thus, litigation alone is inadequate to address climatic 
displacement and provide land rights; indeed, no case has been brought by 
an island state to establish land rights upon international displacement. 
2. The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine is not Established 
International Customary Law and Climatic Displacement Falls 
Outside its Limited Scope 
The international legal principle of a “responsibility to protect”  
(“R2P”) arguably could be invoked to provide land rights to climate 
refugees, although the doctrine probably does not extend far enough to cover 
climatic displacement.  The International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty developed the idea of R2P in a 2001 report.73  The central 
theme is that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their citizens 
from catastrophe, but when states fail to live up to this obligation, the 
international community has a responsibility to protect suffering 
individuals.74   
The doctrine typically applies to situations of mass murder, rape, and 
starvation where a domestic failure to react is “widespread and 
systematic,”75 although arguments have been made that the doctrine should 
expand to include natural disasters.76  However, reliance on R2P in the 
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climate change context is tenuous for two reasons.  First, the principle has 
not yet ripened into widely accepted customary international law.77  Second, 
even if the principle does become part of customary international law, 
climatic displacement challenges may extend beyond the scope of the 
doctrine’s application.78  Further, R2P has never provided land rights to 
displaced populations. 
3. Human Rights Norms Fall Short of Providing Adequate Land Rights 
to Climate Refugees Because of Inconsistent Enforcement 
A number of principles of international human rights law apply to the 
climate change challenge, including Articles 6 and 12 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantee a right to life and 
recognize the right of freedom of movement and choice of residence.79 
Additionally, because climate change directly compromises economic, 
social, and cultural rights, it also implicates Articles 6, 11, and 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which 
guarantee a right to livelihood, food, water, housing, health and an adequate 
standard of living.80  Climate change impacts each of these essential human 
rights through prevalence of disease, disturbed agricultural and water 
sources, displacement, and damaged systems relied on for livelihoods. 81     
However, the history of human rights adherence and enforcement 
suggests that human rights norms will not adequately provide land rights to 
climate refugees.  States like Kiribati will face climatic displacement over 
the next ten decades due to rising ocean levels.82  History indicates that 
human rights movements operate slowly,83 and garnering enough support in 
the human rights community could prove difficult in the near future.84  
Further, human rights advocates may hesitate to divert valuable resources 
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toward climatic displacement, seeing the climate realm as more of a 
scientific than a human problem.85   
Even if the human rights movement enveloped climatic displacement, 
the track record of human rights efforts reveals serious enforcement 
problems.86  Human rights conventions87 require reports only from member 
states, so nonmember states and unrecognized states avoid compliance with 
the conventions’ provisions.88  Also, international actors have inconsistently 
interpreted and incorporated human rights norms into domestic policies.89   
Ultimately, human rights norms do not guarantee land rights to displaced 
populations.90 
4. Existing Refugee Laws are Inappropriate to Respond to the Unique 
Challenges Posed by Climatic Displacement 
Existing refugee laws seem to present a natural solution to climatic 
displacement, but serious long-term concerns preclude this option.  The 
international community has been reluctant to label individuals displaced by 
climate change as “refugees.”91  “International refugee law . . . was not 
designed for those who are left homeless by environmental pressures,” and 
ultimately, international law is unfit to deal with the millions of expected 
climate refugees.92  Further, the circumstances surrounding climatic 
displacement are entirely distinct from circumstances surrounding political 
displacement, and a legal solution must consider the unique circumstances of 
climate refugees, who are not fleeing from a well-founded fear.93  So far, 
only the Finnish and Swedish Aliens Acts recognize environmental 
refugees.94  The majority of domestic asylum systems do not accommodate 
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environmental refugees, let alone climate refugees.95  Further, when granted 
asylum, refugees are not provided land rights, so a new international legal 
mechanism must be created.96   
5. All Four Alternative Legal Mechanisms are Inappropriate to Respond 
to Displacement in Kiribati 
Ultimately, the challenges posed by climatic displacement are of a 
unique breed, and therefore, a new international treaty regime must be 
developed to create land rights for climate refugees like the I-Kiribati.  Other 
available legal mechanisms are inadequate to address Kiribati’s 
displacement because no appropriate forum exists for Kiribati to instigate 
litigation, the R2P principle does not extend far enough to cover 
displacement of I-Kiribati, human rights norms produce inadequate results, 
and there are no existing international climate refugee laws to respond to the 
displacement of low-lying island populations. 
6. Treaties Represent the Most Appropriate Response Mechanism to 
Address Climatic Displacement and Establish Land Rights for 
Climate Refugees 
Treaties97 are the most appropriate international legal mechanism to 
provide land rights to displaced nations due to the inherently global nature of 
the climate problem, treaties’ legally binding nature, treaties’ voluntary 
nature, and the deliberate nature of the treaty negotiation process.98  For a 
number of reasons, I-Kiribati displacement will best be addressed through a 
new international treaty guaranteeing land rights. 
First, treaties create binding legal obligations.99  Parties to a treaty 
internalize compliance, and compliance becomes the international norm.100 
Treaties become part of domestic law either automatically without 
implementing legislation or through domestic legislation.101  Further, Article 
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26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is well 
established and widely ratified, stipulates that every treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties and must be performed in good faith,102 or else states can be 
found in violation of the treaty. 
Countries breaching treaty obligations may be held liable under 
international law.103  Treaty enforcement mechanisms come in both positive 
and negative forms.104  Positive enforcement mechanisms create incentives 
for compliance, including monetary benefits, political capital, and 
transparency.105  Negative enforcement mechanisms are punitive measures 
for non-compliance such as reparations, agreement withdrawal, 106 and 
membership sanctions.107  Some treaty breaches also have domestic 
consequences.  For example, in the United States, self-executing treaties 
automatically become part of domestic law.108  Thus, in many instances, 
treaty rights and obligations may be enforced domestically.109 
Second, treaty formation is a voluntary process often involving 
lengthy negotiations.110  States entering agreements voluntarily are less 
likely to deviate from the carefully crafted terms of the treaty.  Nations take 
treaty formation seriously becasue treaty breaches may have legal 
ramifications.111  States engage in careful deliberation and negotiation to 
ensure that their interests will not be detrimentally impacted by positive or 
negative enforcement mechanisms.112  This cautious approach works well 
regarding climatic displacement, an area of international law still undefined 
and full of uncertainty.   
Third, the dissemination of treaties influences the formation of 
customary international law.113  Customary law represents a set of 
international legal norms that become binding after routine state practice and 
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opinio juris114 are established.115  Thus, the treaty process will play an 
essential role in shaping future climatic displacement laws.   
Finally, treaty development establishes a set of binding legal 
principles that parties adhere to without litigation on a case-by-case basis.  
States facing serious human impacts of climatic displacement require readily 
available assistance.116  The most successful international laws do not 
require court action to secure observation.117  Additionally, Article 18 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties mandates that states signing 
treaties must restrain from measures that would defeat the purpose and 
objective of the treaty.118  Thus, without relying on litigation, signatories and 
parties must act in accordance with treaty provisions. 
Despite these strengths, treaties are not a perfect model for providing 
land rights to displaced nations.  The treaty negotiation process may be quite 
lengthy;119 parties with less bargaining power may be disenfranchised or 
marginalized;120 political considerations inevitably influence negotiations;121 
and treaty participation is voluntary.122  Developed nations like the United 
States could simply refuse to engage in negotiations.  However, absolute 
reliance on other available methods like litigation, invocation of R2P, human 
rights norms, and existing refugee law is inadequate.123  Thus, formation of 
new treaties represents the best mechanism to address climatic displacement 
and ensure land rights for climate refugees. 
B. Existing Treaties Suggest Climate Solutions, but Future Regimes Must 
Go Further to Address Land Rights 
Existing international treaties suggest there is an international legal 
duty to respond to climatic displacement, but none of the treaties goes far 
enough to provide land rights to displaced island nations.  Three treaties 
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outline potential legal obligations for developed states to provide assistance 
to victims of climatic displacement:  the Kiribati-United States Treaty of 
Friendship and Territorial Sovereignty (“Friendship Treaty”), the South 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme (“SPREP”) Agreement, and the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). 
These three treaties offer some insight into potentially useful legal 
mechanisms and language; however, they all fall short of meeting the needs 
of persons displaced by climate change.   
1. The Friendship Treaty Indicates a Legal Responsibility to Provide 
Relocation Assistance, but the United States is Unlikely to Act 
The United States has a strong historical presence in Kiribati.124  Upon 
Kiribati’s independence in 1979, the United States signed the Friendship 
Treaty with Kiribati, relinquishing U.S. claims to Kiribati’s Phoenix and 
Line Islands.125  Language in the text of the Friendship Treaty creates 
potential legal obligations for the United States to assist Kiribati in 
environmental crisis caused by rising ocean levels.126   
First, Article 2 of the Friendship Treaty promises U.S. assistance in 
emergencies, as well as over-arching development aid.127  Article 2 states 
that the United States will provide assistance to Kiribati through 
collaboration “on matters of mutual concern and interest in time of need.”128  
Since this particular Friendship Treaty has never been called upon in court, 
there is no precedent against using the language in an expansive manner.129   
With rising oceans impacting every level of society, Kiribati faces a 
dire “time of need.”130  Climatic displacement qualifies as an issue of 
“mutual concern” given the global effects of climatic displacement, and the 
United States could interpret the Friendship Treaty to prompt provision of 
climate-specific aid to Kiribati, including land rights.  Climate change 
impacts Kiribati’s fisheries resources, and the United States has an economic 
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interest in South Pacific fisheries.131  Collaboration prompted by mutual 
concern could be invaluable for Kiribati, using U.S. resources to put together 
adaptation and land rights plans.  
Second, Article 2 suggests that through promoting “social and 
economic development, peace, and security in the Pacific region,” 132 the 
United States could provide aid for relocation and land rights.  Economic 
development and peace tangentially relate to climatic displacement, but 
climate change directly affects security on the island.133  The language of the 
treaty does not specify the nature of the threat to security to which the 
United States is obligated to respond.134  Rising ocean levels pose a threat to 
Kiribati’s security; indeed, rising sea levels could completely wipe out the 
nation.135 
Despite the responsibilities suggested by Article 2, the United States 
has no binding responsibility for a number of reasons.  First, the treaty was 
designed to transfer occupied territories back to Kiribati.136  Second, any 
indications of “security” provisions relate to militaristic security.137  The 
United States’ presence in Kiribati was directly linked to militaristic 
operations and goals.138  The Senate ratified the treaty during the Cold War 
era,139 when security concerns dominated the international agenda.140  When 
a U.S. court interprets international treaties, the court gives effect to the 
intent of the treaty parties,141 and climate refugees were not a problem at the 
time the treaty was signed because concern for climatic displacement 
emerged only in recent years.142  Third, the Treaty uses qualifying language 
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such as “mutual concern,” “mutual interest,” and “best efforts.”143  The 
United States could argue that rising ocean levels and climatic displacement 
are not of “mutual concern” or “mutual interest.”  The United States may 
also suggest that their existing efforts are indeed “best efforts,” absolving 
itself of any additional obligation.  Fourth, Kiribati would have a difficult 
time enforcing the obligations in the treaty, particularly because the United 
States is not subject to ICJ jurisdiction.144  Finally, U.S. policy has been 
opposed to taking climate related action.145  Given the current economic 
crisis, the United States is unlikely to direct climate assistance to Kiribati146   
However, the Friendship Treaty is instructive in future climate 
responses.  If the United States decides to provide climatic assistance to 
Kiribati, it could rely on the language of the Friendship Treaty to garner 
political support for the decision.  Further, Kiribati may approach the United 
States through diplomatic channels, using the Friendship Treaty as evidence 
for U.S. legal responsibility to provide land rights assistance upon 
displacement of the nation.  However, the treaty lacks land rights language 
so it may not go far enough to respond to climatic displacement.147 
2. The SPREP Agreement Lacks Sufficient Enforcement Mechanisms 
Governments of the South Pacific region established SPREP to 
maintain environmental quality in the region, including climate change 
response, but like the Friendship Treaty, the SPREP Agreement will likely 
prove inadequate in providing land rights to climate refugees.148  However, 
the treaty does suggest a regional legal responsibility to assist with climate 
adaptation.149  The program promotes cooperation and provides assistance in 
order to preserve the environment; specifically, the Pacific Futures program 
under the SPREP aims to address South Pacific climate vulnerabilities.150   
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The SPREP Agreement establishes an agenda cognizant of the 
challenges presented by climate change and rising ocean levels.  Article 2(1) 
of the SPREP sets out an action plan creating a system for cooperation, 
assistance, and adaptation, although it does not specifically mention climatic 
displacement.151  Article 3(5)(c) strengthens the program’s ability to impact 
future climate-related efforts by establishing a commitment to future 
international environmental treaties.152  The challenges associated with 
climate change are likely to become increasingly apparent in the coming 
decades, and SPREP involvement in future treaties ensures representation of 
South Pacific interests.153   
However, critics may argue that the treaty will never induce an 
international response to climatic displacement.  The agreement lacks 
enforceability mechanisms—there are no “punishments” for non-
compliance.  Further, the SPREP Agreement’s primary utility was to 
establish the framework for an international organization, not to create 
legally binding environmental guidelines.154  Finally, the SPREP Agreement, 
like the Friendship Treaty, is not specifically directed at climate change.  
Rather, the regime addresses environmental concerns broadly and says 
nothing about land rights or climatic displacement.155 
Despite its vague language, the SPREP Agreement may impact future 
climate adaptation efforts because its member states include most South 
Pacific nations, as well as a number of developed states.  The developed 
states are held to the same obligations as the Pacific states.156  Ultimately, 
SPREP also lacks adequate lands rights action to assist displaced nations.157  
3. The UNFCCC Provides Mechanisms for Valuable International 
Collaboration, but the UNFCCC System Responds Slowly 
The UNFCCC emerged from the progressive development of the 
international environmental law movement, representing the most 
comprehensive effort to address climate change on an international level.  
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International response to climate change began with the establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988.158  The UNFCCC was 
adopted at the Rio United Nations (“UN”) Conference on Environment and 
Development in 1992 as a broad framework with general objectives and 
principles to be refined by future protocols and agreements.159  One hundred 
and fifty-two governments, including the United States and the European 
Union, ratified the convention.160  The UNFCCC’s language creates specific 
international legal obligations to assist climate adaptation,161 and the 
framework provides a valuable platform for future adaptation treaties, 
including NAPA, a program aimed at providing least developed countries 
(“LDCs”) with adaptation program funding and assistance. 
UNFCCC language indicates legally binding obligations on a scale 
much larger than the Friendship Treaty and the SPREP Agreement, but 
significant international response to climatic displacement has yet to 
materialize.  The relevant sections of the UNFCCC indicate a common and 
shared concern for climate effects, “common but differentiated” 
contributions and responsive capacities, future climate dangers, necessary 
economic considerations, and an emphasis on adaptation mechanisms that 
could include land rights.162  Each treaty provision, while vague, could be 
read to assist island states like Kiribati with climatic displacement and land 
rights acquisition. 
The preamble of the UNFCCC recognizes the needs of the parties to 
the treaty.163  The first line of the UNFCCC reads, “The Parties to this 
Convention, Acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and its 
adverse effects are a common concern of humankind . . . .”164  The treaty 
goes on to elaborate on the global nature of climate change, while indicating 
the different roles developed and developing states must take in addressing 
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climate change.165  The language “common but differentiated” indicates a 
recognition by developed states that part of their role in addressing climate 
change must be to provide assistance to countries with lower “respective 
capability,” such as small Pacific states like Kiribati.166  The treaty 
specifically addresses the vulnerabilities of island nations, recognizing that 
“low-lying and other small island countries . . . are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change.”167  Thus, the preamble of the 
UNFCCC recognizes the unique position and vulnerability of South Pacific 
Islands, targeting these populations for action and assistance with climatic 
displacement.  Such an acknowledgment hints at moral or ethical obligations 
to work to address climate change.  However, this language falls short of 
being legally enforceable. 
Article 4 contains more concrete legal obligations, suggesting further 
grounds for international climate relocation aid to small island states like 
Kiribati.168  Essential for adaptation mechanisms like land rights provisions, 
Article 4(1)(e) encourages cooperation in addressing the effects of climate 
change in developing regions.169  The article mandates that states shall 
“cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change.”170  
“Cooperation,” taken in conjunction with the article’s reference to “common 
but differentiated responsibilities,”171 highlights the responsibility for 
developed states to provide adaptation and relocation assistance to 
developing states like Kiribati. 
The UNFCCC specifically addresses adaptation funding mechanisms 
in Article 4(4), reinforcing the role of developed states in providing 
necessary assistance to developing states.172  Article 4(4) creates a binding 
legal obligation that developed countries shall help developing countries like 
                                           
165
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Kiribati meet “costs of adaptation,” which could include land rights.173  The 
article does not specify the type of adaptation required to receive funding, 
leaving specific determinations to the states involved.  Such unspecified 
language allows developing states to stipulate their interests, including a 
request for land rights, but the language may not require developed states to 
listen.  
Overall, the UNFCCC has been widely revered and ratified, but the 
treaty has not elicited significant international action.  The document serves 
as a flexible mechanism to facilitate the development of future commitments 
and obligations, but the unspecified obligations also allow states, particularly 
developed states, to shirk responsibility.174   The preamble and Articles 
4(1)(e) and 4(4) all include language suggesting obligations to address 
climate change and provide displacement assistance, yet little action has 
been taken in the Pacific region to address the effects of climate change 
already impacting individuals.  The UNFCCC also fails to adequately 
discuss land rights provisions upon international climatic displacement.175 
C. NAPA Provides a Feasible Adaptation Model to Provide Land Rights 
in Relocation Efforts 
Despite UNFCCC’s shortcomings, the UNFCCC Conference of the 
Parties process did produce NAPA, which provides a highly viable model for 
adaptation and land rights provisions.176  The purpose of NAPA is to address 
the immediate needs of individual countries to adapt to the pressing 
challenges posed by climate change by providing technical support and 
project-specific funding.177  In NAPA applications, countries stipulate their 
unique needs and request funding for particular adaptation projects that 
could include land rights development programs to assist displaced countries 
and host countries to work out relocation plans.178  The program, available 
only to the least developed countries, provides funding from the Global 
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Environment Facility (“GEF”)179 and access to the Least Developed 
Countries Expert Group.180  Preparation of a NAPA application involves 
various stakeholders, including local communities.181  
To date, the NAPA program has received and accepted applications 
from forty-four of the least developed countries, including Kiribati.182 
Kiribati’s NAPA application requested funding for ten adaptation projects, 
including well improvement, coastal management, and agricultural 
development.183  With only a few minor changes to the titles of the 
adaptation program components, Kiribati’s NAPA application was accepted 
and funded in its entirety.184  Kiribati’s accepted NAPA program will have a 
direct impact in the country’s effort to adapt to rising ocean levels, but the 
program focuses on the most vulnerable sectors in the most populous 
locations, not climatic displacement.185  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING LAND RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
USING THE NAPA FRAMEWORK  
The NAPA program provides a viable model for creating a new 
international treaty to address climatic displacement and provide land rights 
to displaced individuals from states like Kiribati.  As currently outlined in 
the Marrakech Accords, the NAPA program places no monetary cap on 
requested contributions.186  Notwithstanding the incredible potential of the 
NAPA program, some necessary changes should be made to the NAPA 
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program to provide land rights to climate refugees since NAPA focuses on 
immediate needs, not longer-term concerns.187 
A. NAPA Represents a Viable Framework to Provide Land Rights 
The NAPA program establishes a viable framework for an 
international treaty providing land rights to displaced nations due to its past 
success and engagement with local stakeholders.  The track record of the 
NAPA program indicates an ability and willingness to provide LDCs, 
including Kiribati, with requested projects and funding.188  With adequate 
increases in available funds, NAPA could be expanded to allow countries to 
request relocation assistance and land rights provisions.189  The form of such 
assistance will vary by location and displaced nation, but local participation 
by threatened states ensures an authentic and appropriate response to the 
major challenges faced by climatic displacement of entire nations.190  This 
philosophy of local participation could be expanded in a new international 
treaty, allowing host countries to engage in the process of establishing land 
rights. 
B. The NAPA System Should Be Developed in a New Treaty Regime, 
Distinct from the UNFCCC 
Although NAPA was developed under the UNFCCC, a new treaty 
regime should be created to provide land rights to displaced island nations 
like Kiribati.  As the failed Copenhagen negotiations indicate,191 the 
UNFCCC may be inadequate to respond to climatic displacement due to the 
“framework” nature of the convention and the convention’s lack of focus on 
climate adaptation.  Since displacement of entire nations is an unprecedented 
international challenge, an entirely new treaty regime is appropriate. The 
new treaty must address the inadequacies of the Friendship Treaty, the 
SPREP Agreement, and the UNFCCC, with more definite language and 
enforcement mechanisms.192  Rather than undermining or competing with 
existing NAPA efforts, the new treaty regime must work with the GEF and 
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the UNFCCC member states to develop a system that adequately provides 
lands rights to displaced nations under NAPA.  Parties to the new treaty 
would agree to support, either financially or with land grants, an expansion 
of the GEF and NAPA to include land rights provisions. 
C. Recommended Improvements to the Existing NAPA System 
In order for NAPA to serve as the framework for providing land rights 
to climate refugees, some changes must be made to the existing NAPA 
system.  First, the current scope of NAPA must be dramatically expanded 
beyond short-term projects to encompass permanent land rights.193  “A 
remaining challenge is the link between current climatic risks and longer-
term climate change.”194  Countries thus far have limited their requests under 
NAPA to “immediate and urgent” concerns, and no country has requested 
land rights provisions or relocation assistance.195  Second, support must be 
increased at the implementation stage of NAPA projects to ensure that 
projects are fully carried out.196  Some nations complain that they lack 
adequate support in final project stages to complete the NAPA process.197  
Third, in order to encourage countries to host and provide land rights to 
climate refugees, the NAPA funding and project parameters must be 
expanded.198  Currently NAPA applications may only be submitted by LDCs; 
however, providing land rights in new host countries requires new project 
and funding structures that can support the host countries.199  Finally, NAPA 
applications should be more fully integrated into existing national 
development plans of host countries and countries facing displacement.200  
Integration will capitalize on existing efforts and resources, raise awareness, 
and promote coordination.201  These four measures will allow a new treaty 
regime based on NAPA to accommodate the international influx of climate 
refugees and provide land rights to internationally displaced individuals. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Climate change causes rising ocean levels, which threaten the 
existence of low-lying Pacific states like Kiribati, and the international 
community must be prepared to respond.  Developed states have a 
responsibility, as the perpetrators of climate change, to use available 
resources to assist developing states that imminently face displacement. 
International assistance or compensation, combined with local knowledge, 
education, and action allows island states to better respond to the threats 
posed by climate change.   
A future treaty regime to provide land rights for nations displaced by 
rising ocean levels must react to the inadequacies of past international 
agreements and develop innovative approaches to emerging problems.  
Adequate land rights provisions in future displacement treaties will allow 
climate refugees to resettle successfully and improve their economic, social, 
and cultural positions.  “It’s a humbling prospect when a nation has to begin 
talking about its own demise, not because of some inevitable natural 
disaster . . . but because of what we are doing on this planet.”202  The 
international community ought to respond to “what we are doing on this 
planet,” take responsibility, and assist Kiribati in addressing their “demise” 
appropriately.  A new treaty, which expands the current NAPA model to 
provide land rights for victims of climatic displacement, will ensure that 
climate refugees have the opportunity to relocate successfully when entire 
nations disappear under rising ocean levels. 
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